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I.

INTRODUCTION

There are very few judicial opinions that discuss what
procedural mechanisms must be provided to suspected terrorists in
order to comport with their due process rights. Even fewer address
the due process concerns inherent in rendition of a United States
citizen suspected of terrorism. This paper, based on hypothetical
facts and written in the form of a judicial opinion, addresses this
* J.D. Candidate 2009, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., History, with
honors, Grinnell College, 2003. The author thanks Professor A. John Radsan for
his assistance with this article.

5195

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 9

5196

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:5

issue. The facts in this opinion are wholly fictional, as they must be.
The innately secretive nature of rendition prevents the facts of real
renditions from emerging. Using a fictitious scenario, this paper
examines the due process implications of rendering a U.S. citizen
from one foreign jurisdiction to another.
This mock judicial opinion discusses the executive power to
render a U.S. citizen living abroad to a foreign jurisdiction.' It
reaches the conclusion that the President has the inherent ?ower
to render an American citizen to a foreign jurisdiction and
addresses substantive and procedural due process issues. After
determining that a substantive due process right exists, the opinion
outlines the procedural elements required to comport with the
procedural due process rights owed to the mock suspected
terrorist, Joel Tuuri.4

1. See infra Part IV.
2. See infra Part IV. I reach the conclusion that the President has the
inherent power to authorize a rendition in order to address the due process issues.
The President's inherent power to authorize renditions warrants its own separate
and complete analysis.
3. See infra Part V.
4. See infra Part V.B.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Court File No. 123456

United States,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
V.

Joel Tuuri,

Defendant.

II.

FACTS

Based on the record, the Court takes these facts5 to be true for the
purposes of this decision:

1. Joel Tuuri is a 35-year-old American citizen and a
second-generation immigrant, his parents having
emigrated from Finland to the United States shortly
before his birth.
2. Tuuri lives in Barcelona, Spain and works for the U.S.based corporation Technology Systems Inc.
3. Tuuri obtained his Bachelor of Science degree in
Engineering at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He
then obtained a Masters degree in Electrical
5.

See supra Part I.
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Engineering at Helsinki University of Technology.
4. Tuuri travels to Chicago bimonthly for work purposes
and to visit his parents. He has maintained close ties to
his Finish ancestry and generally travels to Finland two
to three times a year.
5. American intelligence officials at the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) discovered that Tuuri may
be working for al Qaeda. Cell phone records show calls
from Tuuri to known al Qaeda leaders.
6. Intelligence officials persuaded Technology Systems
Inc. to allow them to scan documents off Tuuri's work
computer.
They successfully decoded a set of
documents saved on Tuuri's computer that contained
detailed instructions for detonating a bomb at an
elevated train stop in downtown Chicago.
7. Based on this information, American intelligence
officials deemed Tuuri to be a grave threat to national
security and recommended he be detained and
interrogated immediately.
8.

Many of the documents and witnesses relevant to the
CIA's investigation were located in Finland. The CIA
contacted Spanish authorities to consult with them on
transporting Tuuri to Finland for interrogation. The
Spanish government was unwilling to hand Tuuri over
to the Finish government.

9. Finish officials were unwilling to transport Tuuri from
Spain without the consent of Spanish officials.
However, Finish officials agreed to interrogate Tuuri if
he was rendered to Finland.
10. The CIA took custody of Tuuri while he was at work in
Barcelona. Tuuri was taken to a secret site in Spain,
and the CIA made arrangements to render him from
Spain to Finland.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss5/9
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11. Tuuri's counsel learned of the CIA's plans to render
Tuuri to Finland and leaked the operation to Spanish
authorities.
12. Tuuri's counsel then filed a habeas petition on his
behalf in United States district court asserting that the
proposed rendition was unconstitutional.
13. Tuuri is now being held at the U.S. Consulate in
Barcelona.
The Court has also found:
1. The proposed rendition was a violation of Spanish and
International law.
2. According to the U.S. Department of State, Finland has
a nearly unblemished human rights record.6 Therefore
the Convention against Torture is not implicated by
this rendition.7

6. BUREAU OF DEMOcRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
PRACTICES
IN
FINLAND
(2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78811.htm.
The report states that
the laws of Finland prohibit torture and other forms of cruel or degrading
punishment. It also confirms that no reports of such practices by the Finnish
Government arose in 2005. Furthermore, human rights groups investigated and
published their findings without interference by the Finnish Government.
7. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Article three of the Convention against Torture
(CAT) states that individuals may not be rendered to another jurisdiction if
there are "substantial grounds" for thinking that the rendered individuals will
be subject to torture in the receiving country. Id. at part I, art. III. Allegations
of violations of the CAT or general allegations of torture and inhumane
treatment are raised in most court cases involving renditions. See, e.g., ElMasri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2007); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.
Supp. 2d 530, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 2006); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250,
272-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). How one evaluates the legality of a proposed
rendition under the CAT, and to what extent the CAT is integrated into U.S.
law are questions that are beyond the scope of this paper. To preclude
inquiry into these topics, Tuuri is being rendered to a country where
substantial grounds do not exist for believing he will be subject to torture. For
a more in-depth discussion of renditions and the CAT, see the following
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3. The Government has stipulated that it will not be
asserting the state secrets privilege or the Totten
doctrine as affirmed in Tenet v. Doe.8

III. ISSUES
This case presents the issue of whether the executive branch of
the United States Government has the authority to render an
American citizen from one foreign jurisdiction to another, and, if
so, what process is due to the accused before the rendition can
occur. We hold that the President does have the authority to
render individuals pursuant to his inherent powers. 9 We further
determine that Tuuri is entitled to notice of the charges against
him and a hearing to contest those charges before a neutral
decision maker.
IV. AUTHORIZATION
A.

Authorization Under the AUMF

The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate
force" against countries, organizations, or persons that he
determines were involved in the 9/11 attacks.1 ° In Hamdi v.

articles: Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances
and the Legality of "Rendition," 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213 (2006) (concluding
that, in addition to diplomatic assurances, the U.S. Government is obligated
to consider all evidence with regard to the likelihood of torture in a country);
A. John Radsan, A More Regular Processfor IrregularRendition, 37 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1 (2006) (stating that through the use of various techniques such as
assurances and post-transfer monitoring the U.S. Government could lawfully
engage in rendition); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of
America's "ExtraordinaryRendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106
(describing the history of rendition and its transformation under the Bush
administration).
8. 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005) (affirming the Totten doctrine, which precludes
judicial inquiry into covert espionage agreements).
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat
224, 224 (2001).
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Rumsfeld," the plurality held that the Government had statutory
authority to detain an enemy combatant under the AUMF when
the individual was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan."
However, the plurality did not interpret the AUMF as authorizing
the detention of terrorism suspects who were captured outside the
realm of a traditional war setting.1
Given the narrow holding in Hamdi, Tuuri's rendition cannot
be authorized by the AUMF. Hamdi's detention qualifies as a
traditional law of armed conflict capture because Hamdi was
captured on the• battlefield
in Afghanistan
while allegedly taking up
.
14
arms against the United States.
Unlike Hamdi, Tuuri was not
captured in a traditional combat setting, and detaining Tuuri does
not serve the purpose of ensuring that he does not return to the
battlefield.' 5
While the detention does keep him from
communicating with al Qaeda and carrying out the organization's
plans, these activities
do not constitute war waging in the
16
traditional sense. Because Tuuri was not captured in a traditional
war setting, he cannot be classified as an enemy combatant.
Therefore, the laws of war do not apply to Tuuri, 7 and the
"necessary and appropriate force"1 8 authorized under the AUMF
cannot apply to him. If the AUMF is meant to cover individuals

11. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
12. Id. at 518.
13. See id. at 519 ("Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the
battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of
,necessary and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably
authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.").
14. Id. at 518 (explaining that individuals fighting against the United States as
part of the Taliban, an organization known to have taken part in the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, are people Congress meant to be included within the scope of the AUMF).
15. See id. ("The purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from
returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again.").
16.

See id. at 517-18 (recognizing only a narrow category of individuals the

President may detain pursuant to the AUMF: members of the Taliban associated
with the 9/11 attacks).
17. But see John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L.
L. 207, 215 (2003) (explaining the view that the conflict with al Qaeda does
constitute a war even if it is not waged against state actors on a traditional
battleground).
18. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
19. The Hamdi Court did state that the traditional laws of war may become
obsolete if the war on terrorism becomes unlike any of the traditional wars of the
past waged on a set battlefield. 542 U.S. at 521. However, the traditional practice
of waging war on the battlefield is still a part of the war on terrorism. See id.
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such as Tuuri, captured far from any battlefield and outside the
laws of war, then it is the task of Congress to clarify the intended
20
scope of the authorization.
It is not the role of this Court to
expand the AUMF's coverage.
B. Inherent PresidentialPowers
Because the AUMF does not authorize Tuuri's rendition, we
next turn to the President's inherent powers. We hold that under
the President's commander-in-chief 2'and foreign policy powers he
is able to authorize the rendition of an individual from one foreign
jurisdiction to another.
In analyzing the President's inherent powers we turn first to
the well-known Jackson categories, which explain that the extent of
the President's power is often contingent on Congress's action or
22
inaction. When the President acts pursuant to Congress's express
or implied authorization, he acts within his highest level of
authority. 23 When the President acts in the face of congressional
silence, the distribution of power between the government
branches is unclear, and when the President acts in a way that is
incompatible with the congressional will, his power is at its lowest
point.24 While the Jackson categories apply in many contexts, the

President is traditionally given a great deal of discretion in the area
25
of foreign affairs.
In rendering Tuuri to Finland, the President is acting in an
area where the distribution of power
between the executive and
26
legislative branches is uncertain.
While acting in this "zone of

Therefore, the laws of war have not become obsolete and are still useful in
ascertaining the legality of the detentions of alleged terrorists.
20. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2133 (2005) (encouraging additional
congressional participation in clarifying the application of the AUMF to the

various circumstances arising as part of the war on terrorism).
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 1.
22.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-40 (1952)

(Jackson. J., concurring).
23. Id. at 635-37.
24. Id. at 637-38.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936) (stating that in dealing with foreign affairs the President has a "delicate,
plenary, and exclusive power").
26. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson,J, concurring).
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twilight," the President is authorized in ordering the rendition.27
Whether to render an individual from one foreign jurisdiction to
another is, in essence, a foreign policy decision.2 Also, because
Tuuri's rendition is motivated by national security concerns, the
President is acting within his commander-in-chief capacity in
protecting our nation from the threat of terrorism. 29 Within these
traditional spheres of executive power, courts have generally
afforded the President a great degree of discretion. We therefore
hold that the President may, pursuant to his inherent powers,
render an individual from one foreign jurisdiction to another.
V.

DUE PROCESS

Because we hold that the President has the power to order the
rendition, we must determine whether Tuuri has a substantive due
process interest. If Tuuri does have a cognizable liberty interest at
stake, we will next consider what procedural mechanisms are
constitutionally required.
A.

Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process protects fundamental rights, such as
the right to be free from unlawful imprisonment. Fundamental
rights are inherently part of the conceptualization of liberty under
27. See id.; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 2096-97. Bradley
and Goldsmith state that the AUMF should not be read as a blanket prohibition of
executive actions that violate international law. Id. Congress's failure to authorize
a certain detention under the AUMF does not preclude the action from falling
into Jackson's middle category. Id. Therefore, while the U.S. Government would
have violated international law if the proposed rendition had taken place, it would
not necessarily have acted in a manner contrary to congressional intent as
articulated in the AUMF. See id. at 2097.
28. See Curtis-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 ("In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.").
29. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580-81 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing the importance of the unitary Executive in making
national security and foreign policy decisions); see also RobertJ. Delahunty &John
C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against
Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARv. J.L. &

PUB. POL'Y 487, 516-17 (2002). Delahunty and Yoo argue that the President has
plenary power under the Constitution to respond to terrorist attacks. Id. at 516.
They contend that this broad view of inherent presidential powers is supported by
the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, as well as the traditional
practices of the executive office. Id. at 516-17.
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the Fifth Amendment.30
Tuuri clearly has a substantial and
fundamental liberty interest at stake. The Government is seeking
to render
Tuuri to Finland where he will be detained and
31
S
questioned. It is unclear when and under what circumstances the
Finish government would release him. Detention of an alleged
terrorist for an unspecified period of time clearly implicates a
liberty
interest that cannot be infringed without due process of the
32
law.
The Government contends that no substantive due process
interest is involved because it is Finland, not the United States, that
would detain Tuuri. We do not agree. In DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Services, the Court stated that the Due Process
Clause does not require the state to protect an individual's liberty
31
against invasion by a private actor. Instead, the clause serves as a
limitation on the Government's power to act. 34 This dicta is the
basis for the state-created danger doctrine, which states that if the
Government affirmatively acts in a manner that laces an individual
in danger, a substantive due process right arises.
Under the state-created danger doctrine, Tuuri's right to
substantive due process is clearly implicated, even though Finland,
and not the United States, would detain him.3 r Tuuri is not asking

30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
(stating that the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component disallowing
arbitrary government action); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)
(emphasizing that a state must have a constitutionally adequate purpose for
confining an individual).
31. See supra Part II.
32. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 175 (4th Cir.
2007), reh'ggranted;Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2004).
33. 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing
between passive and affirmative action in a state-created danger principle); Kneipp
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1207 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that liability under the statecreated danger theory arises from affirmative acts); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d
583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989) (examining the defendant's conduct to determine if
he affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger).
36. SeeDeshaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to prevent the Government from inappropriately using its power); Pena,
432 F.3d at 109 (holding that when the State assists or encourages another to act it
creates a danger); see also Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of
InternationalDetainee Transfers, 40 U. RicH. L. REv. 657, 739 n.368 (2006) (asserting
that, while the state-created danger doctrine was developed within the context of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuits, the actual substance of the substantive due process
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the Government to protect him from outside actors; he is asking
the Government to refrain from actively participating in his
rendition and detention.
Undoubtedly, the Government has
deprived Tuuri of a liberty interest, either indirectly through the
state-created dangers doctrine or directly through its active
involvement in the rendition process.
B. ProcedurealDue Process
Because Tuuri was deprived of a constitutionally recognized
liberty interest, we must next determine what procedural due
process elements are necessary to comport with the demands of
due process. When the Government seeks to deprive an individual
of his liberty, the court must put a fundamentally fair procedure in
place to ensure that the taking of the interest is lawful.s We hold
that the Government did not need to provide Tuuri with a
preliminary hearing before taking him into U.S. custody in Spain.
At the accused's capture, the Government must only inform the
accused of the general nature of the charges against him.
However, before the United States can render an American citizen
from one foreign 4jurisdiction
to another, the accused must be
granted a hearing.
We determine what procedure will satisfy due process by
examining Hamdi and other precedent analyzing the requisite due
process measures. Past cases, particularly cases discussing the
procedure due to parolees and prisoners, are illustrative of the type
of procedures that may be required here.4' We must also apply the
protection is the same in the context of a habeas corpus review).
37. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
38. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993) (explaining that a procedure
must be put in place that will minimize the risk of error); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that due process applies, the
question remains what process is due."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967) ("Due
process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom.
It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of
the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.").
39. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (explaining that the
process described in the court's opinion applies to situations where the
Government continues to hold an individual, and does not apply to the initial
capture).
40. See id. (stating that the basic due process afforded captured combatants
applies only when the Government decides to continue to hold them in custody).
41. Because few national security cases have reached the due process
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Eldridge balancing test to ascertain what procedures will be
42
constitutionally required.
Under the Eldridge balancing test, we consider the nature of
the private interest that will be affected by Government action, the
additional
risk of erroneous deprivation, the probable value of
41
procedural safeguards, and the Government interest. We must
implement a fair process to ensure the detention is lawful.
Providing a fair process to the accused does not necessarily mean
he will be afforded the "full panoply of rights" given to a criminal
concept, and what is required
defendant. 4 Due process is a flexible
45
depends on the circumstances.
There are several basic procedural elements that are generally
required to afford an individual his due process rights. The
requisite procedures may include a combination of the following
elements: notice to the accused; a preliminary hearing; a hearing
prior to the final deprivation of rights; and adjudication by a
46
While due process does not call for a
neutral decision maker.
hearing "in every conceivable case of government impairment of
the accused is generally entitled to a hearing
private interest,"
before any significant and lasting deprivation of liberty.48 This
hearing may include an opportunity for the accused to be heard by
the decision maker, to present evidence and witnesses on his own
behalf, to confront unfavorable evidence, and to cross-examine
question, prisoners' tights cases may constitute the most analogous precedent
available from which to ascertain Tuuri's due process rights. This is because these
cases also involved circumstances where both the individual and the Government
had important interests at stake.
42. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
43. Id.
44. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (finding that, where an
individual is not subject to actual criminal prosecution, all of the rights due a
criminal defendant do not necessarily apply).
45. Id. at 481; Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("The very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.")
(citation omitted).
46. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974) (describing the
procedural elements that due process requires before revoking a prisoner's goodtime credits).
47. Cafeteria,367 U.S. at 894.
48. See Wolff 418 U.S. at 557-58 ("This [constitutional] analysis as to liberty
parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. The Court has
consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a
person is finally deprived of his property interests.") (citation omitted).
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witnesses.4 9

In the realm of national security, our task is to balance the
seemingly incommensurable interests of the accused and those of
the Government in order to determine what process is due under
50
In these cases, the accused clearly has a
the Constitution.
fundamental liberty interest at stake. 5' The Government also has
strong interests in protecting our nation's security in the face of
terrorism. 5' Because Hamdi is the only U.S. Supreme Court case
that contains a detailed discussion of what procedure is due to an
alleged terrorist, we begin with a brief summary of Hamdi. We next
consider, in turn, each of the basic procedural elements listed
above.
1.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

Yaser Hamdi was an American citizen captured as an alleged
The
enemy combatant on the battlefield in Afghanistan. 5'
Government asserted that it could justifiably hold Hamdi
indefinitely, absent charges or proceedings, because of Hamdi's
54
The plurality held that
classification as an enemy combatant.
due process protections
procedural
to
certain
entitled
Hamdi was
including an opportunity to dispute his classification as an enemy
Specifically, the plurality found that a citizen
combatant. 5
detained as an enemy combatant must be given notice of the
factual basis of the charges against him, and an opportunity to
contest56 the Government's assertions before a neutral decision
maker.

2. ProceduralDue Process Elements
Tuuri has a fundamental liberty interest in being free from
detention. 7 However, the Government has an important need to
49. E.g., Monissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (explaining the minimum hearing
requirements that must be provided before revoking parole).
50. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528 (2004).
51.
Id. at 529.
52. Id.at 531.
53.
Id.at 510.
Id. at 510-11; see also Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 14,
54.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2003 WL 23189498.
55. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 529 ("Hamdi's "private interest . . . is the most elemental of
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58

maintain national security. With these considerations and the
holding from Hamdi in mind, we next turn to each of the
procedural elements that may be required to comport with Tuuri's
procedural due process rights.
3.

PreliminaryHearing

Whether a court must provide a preliminary hearing to the
accused depends on the severity of the deprivation, as well as the
magnitude of the government interest at stake that would be
undermined by providing a preliminary hearing. 59
Past cases
involving prisoners' rights and the revocation of public benefits
shed light on when a preliminary hearing may be necessary.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court held that due process required
a prompt preliminary hearing to 60determine if there were
reasonable grounds to revoke parole.
The Court stated that a
preliminary
hearing
was
necessary
because
immediate
imprisonment would work a grievous loss on the accused. 61 In a
case adjudicating the discontinuance of public assistance, the
Goldberg Court also held that a preliminary hearing would be
necessary because discontinuing
•
62 an impoverished person's benefits
would constitute a grievous loss. By contrast, in Wolff v. McDonnell,
the Court held that a formalized preliminary hearing was not
constitutionally required. 63
Comparing its facts to those in
Morrissey, the Court reasoned that an already imprisoned
individual's loss of good-time credits was "not the same immediate
disaster" as the revocation of parole. 4 Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that prison procedures must be accommodated
with
5
the government's interest in promoting institutional safety.1
liberty interests-the interest in being free from physical detention by one's own
government.").
58. See id. at 531 ("On the other side of the scale are the weighty and sensitive
governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the
enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.").
59. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (quoting Cafeteria &
Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)).
60.

408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972).

61. Id. at 482.
62. 397 U.S. at 264.
63. 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 562-63 (discussing the risks of retaliation that potentially
accompany prison proceedings).
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Under the present circumstances, a preliminary hearing would
militate against the risk of erroneous deprivation. Nevertheless, we
cannot say that such a hearing is constitutionally required. While
the United States cannot render an American citizen from one
foreign jurisdiction to another before granting the accused a
hearing, we hold that the executive branch may take the accused
into U.S. custody without affording him any process other than
notice of the charges against him.
In reaching this conclusion, we look to the nature of Tuuri's
personal interest and the nature of the governmental interest at
stake. Much like the parolee in Morrissey, Tuuri has a fundamental
liberty interest in being free from imprisonment, and clearly suffers
a grievous loss by being immediately imprisoned upon his
66
capture.
However, the burdens that would be placed on the
Government if it were required to provide the accused with a
hearing prior to capture are quite substantial. In contrast to the
circumstances involved
in Goldberg
v. Kelly, these burdens are not
....
67
merely administrative in nature. Instead, as in Wolff v. McDonnell,
important safety and security interests may be undermined by
granting Tuuri a preliminary hearing. 6'
In the national security context, the Hamdi Court held that a
preliminary hearing was not required, out of deference to the
Government's interest in protecting national security.6 9 The Court
stated, "initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the
process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the
determination is made to continue to hold those who have been
seized."70 As in Hamdi, the Government may take custody of Tuuri
without providing him with a preliminary hearing on the merits.
66. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (noting that the parolee's liberty is valuable
and should be construed within Fourteenth Amendment protection).
67. See 397 U.S. at 266 (stating that the welfare recipient's interests outweigh
any increase in fiscal or administrative burdens for the State).
68. See 418 U.S. at 562 (describing some of the obstacles correctional
institutions face in providing a safe environment for guards and inmates).
69. 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (regarding the exigencies of ongoing
military conflict and the burden on the Executive).
70. Id. at 534. A preliminary hearing would have been virtually impossible in
Hamdi since the capture was made in the context of an armed conflict. See id. at
510 (noting that Hamdi was in Afghanistan during the U.S.-Taliban conflict).
While those same practical obstacles to providing a preliminary hearing do not
exist in Tuuri's case, there are nonetheless strong governmental interests at play
that would potentially be undermined by providing Tuuri with an initial hearing.
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Notice

To comport with due process, we must provide the accused
with a form of notice that is reasonably calculated to inform him of
the impending action and give him the opportunity to respond. 7'
Therefore, the Government must provide Tuuri with prompt
notice of the alleged terrorist acts with which he is charged so he
has reasonable time to offer a rebuttal.7 2 This notice must state the
factual basis of the charge with sufficient specificity so Tuuri can
mount an appropriate defense.73 The notice need not include all
of the facts that are relevant to the charge if certain pertinent facts
would have a substantial likelihood of harming our national
security. The Government will not be required to disclose these
potentially harmful facts unless the accused needs that information
to understand and defend against the allegations.
5.

NeutralDecisionmaker

The right to a neutral decision maker is a basic procedural due
process right.74 However, this right does not necessarily entitle the
accused to have a judicial officer hear his or her case. 5 What is
essential is that the person or entity who hears the case is able to be
impartial and neutral. Given this issue of neutrality, we hold that
the judiciary must retain the power to review habeas petitions from
U.S. citizens who the Government seeks to render from one foreign
jurisdiction to another.
In Washington v. Harper,17 a prisoner challenged the legality of
a prison policy that authorized administering antipsychotic drugs
against the prisoner's will and without a judicial hearing.8 The
Court held that review by an administrative panel did comport with
71. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
72. See Wolff 418 U.S. at 564 (holding that written notice of charges must be
given to an inmate in a disciplinary action at least twenty-four hours prior to his
Adjustment Committee appearance).
73. See id. (holding that this written notice will give the inmate time to

prepare a defense).
74. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (asserting the essential
nature of an impartial decision maker).
75. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972) (holding that the
decision maker should be independent but not necessarily ajudicial officer).
76. See id. at 489 (describing the minimum requirements of due process).
77. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).

78.

Id. at217.
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due process, reasoning that the prisoner's liberty interest is
adequatel protected by allowing medical professionals to make the
decision. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that a
serious danger of institutional bias exists under the non-judicial
hearing procedure. 0
The Washington Court counterbalanced the issue of
institutional bias against the fact that that doctors have a special
81
relationship with their patients and must act in their best interests.
Military officers do not have a special relationship with their
enemies, and other concerns likely overshadow the officers'
consideration of their prisoners' best interests."' A decision maker
acting as part of a military tribunal is primarily concerned with the
institutional goal of optimizing our national security.83
The
officer's primary concern for our nation's security may cause him
or her to give too much weight to the Government's safety
concerns in a case contesting the legality of a Government
rendition. s
The issue of institutional bias is a relevant concern in this case,
and existence of a special relationship does not mitigate its harm. 5
The Government contends that if military tribunals offer the
requisite procedural mechanisms, then those tribunals could
adjudicate the rights of alleged terrorists without the need for
habeas review by the courts. While it is possible that military
tribunals could adhere to the requisite procedural standards, this
should not limit the court's ability to review the decision if a writ of
79. Id. at 236.
80. Id. at 255 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
81. Tung Yin, ProceduralDue Process to Determine "Enemy Combatant" Status in the
War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 405 (2006) (asserting that the Court was
influenced by the technical nature of the determinations, and also by the
relationship that should exist between a patient and medical professional) (citing
Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat to American Health Care or a
Logical Way of Revitalizing the Doctor-PatientRelationship?, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
313, 330 n.11 (2005)).
82. Id.
83. See 78 AM. JUR. 2D War § 35 (2007) (explaining that military tribunals are
used to confront those who deliberately attempt to thwart or impede military

efforts).
84. Yin, supra note 81, at 405 (stating that a soldier's principal obligation is to
protect his or her nation from the enemy).
85. But see id. (explaining that despite the lack of a special relationship
between prison officials and prisoners, those officials serve as decision makers in a
variety of contexts).
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habeas corpus is filed.8 6 Therefore, we hold that even if military
tribunals comply with the procedural elements that are
constitutionally required, the judicial system must retain the ability
to hear cases on habeas review.
6.

HearingProcedures

The hearing must provide the accused with a fair opportunity
to present his case, while also remaining sensitive to the important
governmental interests involved.
To determine what hearing
procedures must be provided, we analyze the holding in Hamdi and
the reasoning from prisoner's rights cases. We hold that Tuuri is
entitled to speak on his own behalf at the hearing. 8 The presiding
court must also permit Tuuri to offer evidence, call witnesses, and
cross-examine adverse witnesses subject to the Government's
national security concerns.89 The court must provide Tuuri with
limited discovery mechanisms to obtain favorable evidence, unless
the government interests are so strong as to make this unworkable.
In order to carry out the rendition, the Government must prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the accused has committed
terrorist acts or is affiliated with a terrorist organization and
planned to commit an act of terrorism. 9°
In Morrissey, the Court held that the parolee must be provided
with an opportunity to be heard, present witnesses, and confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses except where the hearing
officer finds good cause for disallowing the confrontation.9 ' The
Wolff Court held that an already incarcerated prisoner facing the
revocation of good-time credits must be afforded the opportunity
to put forth evidence, which included the right to call witnesses,
86. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
87. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ("[R]esolution of the
issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests . . .
affected.").
88. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (deciding that the
minimum requirements of due process include, inter alia, the opportunity to be
heard in person at the hearing).
89. See id.
90. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (explaining that
imposing a higher burden of proof is one way to guard against the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of liberty).
91. 408 U.S. at 489.
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when such actions would not jeopardize the institution's
correctional goals or the prison's safety. The Wolff Court did not
confrontation or cross-examination were constitutionally
find that
S 93
required. The Court reasoned that the full range of procedures
in Morrissey was not constitutionally required in Wolff because of the
"very different stake the State has in the structure and content of
the prison discipline hearing."9 4 The Court reasoned that it must
not mandate procedures that would undermine the institution's
formidable task
95 of affording "reasonable personal safety for guards
and inmates.,
The procedure that the Court held was constitutionally due in
the prisoners' rights cases offers us guidance as we consider how to
balance the personal and government interests to arrive at a
workable result. It is true that some of the rationales offered in the
prisoners' rights cases for limiting the rights of the accused do not
apply to this case. For example, in prisoners' rights cases the Court
often emphasizes the importance of implementing procedural
mechanisms that comport with the institution's penological or
rehabilitative goals.96 However, with respect to suspected terrorists,
penological or rehabilitative considerations are generally not the
focus. In this context, the goal to be achieved by detention is not
rehabilitation of the suspect; instead, the goal is to debilitate
terrorist networks by imprisoning individuals suspected of working
to further the goals of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda.
Though Tuuri's detention is not authorized under the traditional
918
laws of war, the nature of the detention is more analogous to
capturing an enemy soldier so that he may no longer engage in
combat than it is to civilian imprisonment with its array of
penological and rehabilitative goals.
Some of the institutional safety goals in the prisoners' rights

92. 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
93. Id. at 567-68 (explaining that the rights of confrontation and crossexamination are not considered "universally applicable to all hearings").
94. Id. at 561.
95. Id.at 562.
96. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990); Wolff 418 U.S.
at 562-63; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784 (1973).
97. Yin, supra note 81, at 411-12 (stating that a detention in accordance with
the laws of war has no penological justification).
98. See supra Part IV.A.
99. See Yin, supra note 81, at 411-12.
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cases are analogous to the broader concerns for national security
presented in this case. For example, allowing an alleged terrorist
access to discovery mechanisms may implicate the Government's
national security concerns. If the accused is allowed to engage in a
detailed discovery process, this may unduly burden the
Government administratively.
A detailed discovery process could
lead to national security problems if intelligence information is
disclosed for litigation purposes and then leaked to terrorist
organizations or to the public at large.0 1 A reluctance to so burden
the Government led the Hamdi Court to reject the trial court's
should be afforded access to extensive
conclusion that the• accused
102
discovery mechanisms.
However, it is appropriate to afford Tuuri
an opportunity for discovery that is contingent on the
Government's legitimate need to keep information confidential.
Therefore, to accommodate the interests of the individual and the
Government, the court will allow the accused to engage in limited
discovery, subject to the Government's national security concerns.
a. Evidentiary Standard
The Government contends that the "some evidence standard"
should be the burden of proof used in Tuuri's hearing.' 3 The
Government reasons that while r the.104Court found this standard was
constitutionally deficient in Hamdi, it is appropriate here due to
the seriousness of the allegations against Tuuri. Hamdi was
allegedly a foot solider for al Qaeda, fighting as a member of a
Taliban unit. 10 By contrast, Tuuri has allegedly communicated
regularly with al Qaeda leaders and was formulating
a plan to
106
detonate a bomb in a major metropolitan area.
While we
recognize the Government's legitimate national security concerns,
we maintain that the "some evidence standard" is nevertheless
inappropriate. 10'
100. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004).
101. See id. at 532 (recognizing that the discovery process of the accused may
result in the distraction of military personnel engaged in war and unnecessarily
intrude on national security secrets).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 527.
104. Id. at 537.
105. Id. at 512-13.
106. See supraPart II.
107. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537 (explaining that the "some evidence" standard
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The Government next contends that if the "some evidence"
standard is impermissible, a preponderance of the evidence
standard should be used to determine if Tuuri can be legally
rendered to Finland. Under the circumstances, we find the
preponderance of S• the 108evidence standard of proof to be
Tuuri's ability to engage in discovery,
constitutionally deficient.
offer evidence, call and cross-examine witnesses could be limited to
accommodate the governmental interests at stake. Pairing these
potential limitations with a preponderance of the evidence
standard would tip the scale too far in favor of the Government at
the expense of the individual's constitutional rights.'09 Instead,
there shall be no presumption in favor of either party. The
evaluating court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Tuuri has engaged in the alleged terrorist act or is part of a
terrorist network, and planned to commit an illegal act, before he
may be rendered to Finland for detention and interrogation.' 10
VI. CONCLUSION
The President has the inherent authority to render Tuuri from
Spain to Finland."' Nevertheless, the Government's proposed
action must comport with Tuuri's right to due process."' We hold
that to comport with due process, Tuuri must be afforded notice
and a hearing where he will have the opportunity to be heard by a

is generally used as a standard of review, not as a standard of proof).
108. See Sandosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (explaining that a clear
and convincing evidence standard is required to maintain fundamental fairness
when the individual is threatened with a substantial deprivation of liberty).
109. See id. at 763-64. The Court in Sandosky explained that in termination of
parental rights cases the State is in a much better position to put forth its case than
the parent is in to prepare a defense. The State generally has greater access to
resources, experts, and witnesses.
These factors, when paired with a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, produce an unacceptably high
risk of erroneous deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. Id. In Tuuri's
case, similar concerns are implicated, albeit in a very different context. National
security concerns may preclude several procedural rights normally due to the
accused. The absence of these procedural elements, when coupled with a
preponderance of the evidence standard, would impose an unfair disadvantage on
the accused. The resulting risk of erroneous deprivation is too high to pass
constitutional muster. See id. at 764.
110. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
111. See supraPart IV.B.
112. See supraPart V.
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neutral decision maker."'
A subsequent hearing date will be set based on an order to be
provided to the parties.
VII. ARTICLE CONCLUSION
This article presents some of the issues that would likely be
raised by a court in its analysis of a suspected terrorist's due process
rights. While there are few actual judicial opinions that attempt to
address this topic, I have relied upon the various opinions which
address the substantive and procedural due process rights
necessarily implicated by imprisonment and detention. In writing
this article, I have done nothing more than made a modest attempt
to explore these complex issues. However, given the strong
personal and governmental interests at stake in the national
security law context, any due process determination will require
careful balancing and nuanced analysis of: (1) the inherent powers
of the Executive; (2) the security interest of the Government; (3)
the liberty interests of the accused; and (4) analogous case law.
After a thorough analysis of these components, I conclude that,
even if the President has the inherent authority to render a
suspected terrorist to a foreign jurisdiction, the suspect is entitled
to notice of the charges against him or her and a hearing to contest
those charges before a neutral decision maker.

113.

See supra Part V.B.
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